We study the coverage of U.S. political scandals by U.S. newspapers during the past decade.
In modern societies the mass media are citizens' most important source of information about public affairs. On some issues, such as crime or the state of the economy, citizens can compare the news provided by the media with their personal experience. On other issues, such as foreign affairs, the media are the only source of information for most of the public.
Events concerning the malfeasance of public officials typically fall into the second category. Politicians may wish to communicate directly with voters about certain matters, such as popular policy decisions, but they clearly have no incentive to advertise their wrongdoings. As a result, the mass media have the potential to play a crucial role as watchdogs, informing citizens about any improper conduct by those in power.
Of course, in practice the media might or might not serve as faithful watchdogs. In particular, according to the "agenda-setting" theory of mass media, editors and journalists enjoy considerable freedom in deciding what is newsworthy and what is not, and these choices affect the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant and to what extent.
As pointed out by Lippmann [1922] , events regarding public affairs would be "out of reach, out of sight, out of mind" for citizens if the media happen not to cover them.
In this paper we investigate the coverage of political scandals by approximatively 200 U.S. newspapers during the last decade. We collect data on media coverage through automated keyword-based searches of the NewsLibrary electronic archive, and focus on recent financial scandals involving senators, members of congress, and state governors. Exploiting the newspapers' own archives and the Factiva electronic archive we integrate our dataset with similar information on the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune. Our dataset includes 32 scandals and approximately 200 newspapers. We use this data to test several hypotheses regarding the political behavior of mass media. We match this data with a measure of the explicit partisan position of each newspaper, and a measure of the partisanship of each newspaper's readers. The former is the average propensity to endorse Democratic versus Republican candidates in congressional and statewide races, and the latter is the propensity to vote for Democratic versus Republican candidates in the areas in which each newspaper is sold, weighted by circulation. We also use the circulation data to construct measures of the competitiveness of each newspaper market.
The main finding of our analysis is that partisan biases exhibited on the editorial pages of newspapers are strongly correlated with partisan biases in the coverage of scandals, and with the expected sign. Democratic-leaning newspapers -i.e., those with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic candidates in elections -devote significantly more attention to scandals involving Republican politicians than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-leaning newspapers do the opposite. This bias in coverage of scandals is not confined to the editorial page, but also affects the news sections. The correlation holds strongly even after controlling for the partisan leanings of newspapers' readers. This suggests the bias is due at least in part to "supply side" factors.
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On the other hand, we find that "demand side" factors play a significant role only for local scandals. Newspapers mainly read in Democratic (Republican) areas give significantly more coverage to Republican (Democratic) scandals, but only when the politicians involved in the scandal are from the same state or congressional district where the newspaper is sold. This difference in coverage does not hold for "distant" scandals. In contrast, the supply side effect described in the previous paragraph -that Republican-endorsing newspapers systematically give more coverage to Democratic scandals, and Democratic-endorsing newspapers do the opposite -holds irrespective of the geographical location of the politicians involved.
The relative frequency of stories about political scandals is on average quite small. Thus, in absolute terms the effects we measure are also small. In relative terms, however, the biases are large. Consider a newspaper with a propensity to endorse Democratic candidates that is one standard deviation higher than average. On average, this newspaper would devote 26 percent more coverage to Republican scandals than to Democratic scandals. To put this in perspective, one standard deviation in the endorsement score is what separates the Chicago Tribune from the Denver Post, and the Denver Post from the New York Times.
Finally, we find some evidence that newspapers with larger circulation systematically give more space to scandals, irrespective of the political affiliation of those involved. As discussed below, there are both demand-and supply-side accounts consistent with this relationship.
Our findings contribute to three lines of research on the politics and political economy of the media. unemployment is high and the president is a Democrat, compared to when unemployment is equally high but the president is a Republican.
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Our paper provides a new measure of the third type of bias. One reason to focus on agenda-setting is that abuse of this power is potentially one of the most harmful behaviors by news media, especially if it is used to suppress information. The reason is that it is difficult for consumers to distinguish the scenario "I did not see any news about X today because nothing important happened regarding X" from the alternative "I did not see any news about X today because, although something important happened, the media decided not to publish it." Theoretical models by Anderson The second line of work to which our paper speaks is the theoretical literature on media factors were the main driver of media, then we should expect the degree of ideological or partisan bias exhibited by outlets to closely follow the ideological or partisan positions of their readers or viewers. As noted above, we find a significant correlation between the partisanship of readers and the coverage of local scandals. Also, the correlation between scandal-coverage bias and editorial endorsement bias is strong even after controlling for the partisanship of voters. Thus, our evidence suggests that both supply-side and demand-side factors influence newspaper behavior.
Another important theoretical factor is market competition. Gentzkow et al. We find a negative correlation between competition and supply-driven bias -consistent with the first prediction -but the relationships are rarely statistically significant.
A third factor is the size and ideological composition of the media audience. A model by Larcinese (2009) predicts that newspapers that appeal to moderates or independents should tend to cover all political scandals, irrespective of the political affiliation of the politicians involved. With respect to size, it seems likely that newspapers circulating in a large city should devote more overall coverage to political scandals than newspapers in smaller cities.
First, there is an obvious supply side factor -newspapers with larger circulation also have more resources, and might choose to assign more staff to investigative reporting and coverage of scandals. But there might also be demand-side reasons for such a relationship.
Suppose that (i) readers are confirmation seekers who like to read about scandals involving politicians from the opposition party, and (ii) larger audiences tend to be more ideologically heterogeneous or more diverse in terms of partisanship. Then, as long as readers can simply skip over the articles covering scandals involving politicians from their preferred ideology or party (or do not dislike reading these articles too much), a newspaper catering to the larger audience is likely to find it profitable to cover scandals involving both parties' politicians, and hence will devote more coverage overall to scandals. That is, a newspaper that initially covered only Republican scandals would increase its profits if it decided to cover Democratic scandals as well, because it would gain more readers among Republicans than it would lose among Democrats. We find evidence consistent with both of these predictions.
The third line of work to which we contribute is the research on media coverage of political scandals. In this literature the Watergate affair looms large, as it stimulated interest in how scandals are covered -and sometimes even uncovered -by the mass media. The causes and consequences of Watergate have been widely investigated, and in some cases Watergate is used as a benchmark against which other scandals are to be compared. 5 One issue debated in the political science and communications literatures is whether the mass media act as efficient watchdogs in their coverage of political scandals, or whether they instead inject an excessive dose of sensationalism, making the public skeptical and ultimately cynical and unresponsive. Our contribution to this literature is to add breadth, analyzing coverage for a large number of newspapers and a large number of recent political scandals. By using automatic keyword-based searches, we provide an easily replicable and relatively precise way to estimate the importance of some of the key factors that drive the coverage of political scandals.
We use objective criteria to generate a sample of relatively comparable scandals, and then measure the coverage of all scandals satisfying the selected criteria on all newspapers that are available in the NewsLibrary archive (plus the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times, which we add because they are the largest newspapers in the U.S.
that endorse candidates but are not searchable through NewsLibrary). Thus, we provide a good example of the benefits of automated text-classification procedures. 
Data and Measures
In the empirical analysis, in order to minimize potential selection bias we include a given scandal if and only if it satisfies a set of pretermined conditions. 12 The politicians in our sample have prominent public roles which make them newsworthy for a variety of reasons. In order to restrict attention to articles covering the scandals themselves, we code an article as being about the scandal if the name of the person involved appears together with the one or more of the following words (*'s are wildcards): investigat*, indict*, convict*, guilty, resign*, brib*, ethic*, corrupt*, conspir*, prison, scandal*. To find opinion articles we added the following qualifiers to the "Topic" and "Section" fields in the search: opinion, editorial, comment, commentary, perspective, viewpoint, forum, ideas, citizen voices, sunday punch. 13 We define "news" articles all non-opinion articles.
14 Since newspapers vary greatly in size cross-sectionally (total number of pages, stories, and words), and can also vary in size over time, we focus on the relative frequency of articles about a scandal in each newspaper during the relevant time window. In order to do so, we proxy the total number of articles in each newspaper in each time period by running a search on the word "and." We do the same for opinion pieces, by adding the qualifiers listed above to the "Topic" and "Section" fields when searching for the word "and."
The first half of Table A1 in the online appendix displays summary statistics on scandal coverage for those newspapers that we were able to match with endorsement and readership data. We express relative frequencies of stories in percentage points, and distinguish between total hits, articles and editorials. Overall, scandal stories make up a very small fraction of the total: on average there are around two and a half hits every 10,000 stories. This figure is much higher for editorials (something more than one editorial every 1,000). For all three categories of hits, the distribution is strongly skewed to the right, as witnessed by the large differences between means and medians.
In order to control for the relative localness of a scandal, we construct the dummy variable Instate, which equals one when the politician involved in scandal i is from the state where newspaper j is located. In a similar fashion Local is a dummy which equals one when the politician involved in scandal i is from a congressional district that overlaps heavily with the market area of newspaper j (for congressional scandals). Summary statistics on these variables are again reported in the first half of Table A1 .
As mentioned, we match data on the coverage of scandals with information on the en-dorsement propensity of each newspaper. 15 The main source of endorsement data is Ansolabehere et al. (2006), which we supplement with additional information obtained via searches on the NewsLibrary archive.
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We define the "partisan bias" of a newspaper as the propensity for the newspaper to endorse one of the parties during electoral campaigns, controlling for the quality of candidates and their incumbency status. We used a linear regression model to estimate these biases.
Let i index offices, let j index newspapers and let t index years. Let
1 if newspaper j endorses Democrat for office i in year t −1 if newspaper j endorses Republican for office i in year t 0 if newspaper j explicitly makes no endorsement for office i in year t measure the endorsement behavior by each newspaper endorsing a candidate in a race (explicitly refusing to do so). 17 Also, let
Democrat for office i in year t is only incumbent −1 if Republican for office i in year t is only incumbent 0 if otherwise measure the incumbency status of the candidates in each race. 18 Finally, we use previous electoral experience to measure the quality of non-incumbents. To be more specific, define a "high-quality" candidate as a candidate who currently holds a U.S. House seat or an elected statewide office other than the office sought. Let
Democrat for office i in year t is only high quality non-incumbent −1 if Republican for office i in year t is only high quality non-incumbent 0 otherwise
We estimated the following linear model for the period 1992-2006, exploiting the panel nature of the data:
The newspaper-specific fixed effects, N E j , capture newspapers' partisanship. 19 Overall, we have sufficient data on both endorsements and scandal coverage for 213 newspapers. Table A1 in the online appendix.
Partisan Bias: Two-Stage Analysis
We begin with a simple and intuitive two-stage analysis. First we separately estimate newspaper-specific propensities to cover Democratic and Republican scandals, controlling for factors such as whether the scandal involves a politician from the same state or city as the newspaper. Then we regress the difference in these estimated propensities against our measures of endorsement partisanship and reader partisanship.
More precisely, for each Democratic scandal i = 1, ..., 13, let n D ij be the relative frequency of articles published by newspaper j about scandal i during the relevant time window.
Define n R ij similarly, for each Republican scandal i = 1, ..., 19. We run the following two panel regressions:
where α D i and α R i are scandal-specific fixed effects; β D j and β R j are newspaper-specific fixed effects; the Instate and the Local dummy variables are described above. Since we have data not only on the overall coverage of scandals on the newspaper, but separate information on the coverage devoted on the editorial page and on the news section, we can perform these regressions on three different items: relative frequencies of total hits, relative frequencies of news hits, and relative frequencies of opinion hits.
Our focus is on the differential coverage of Republican and Democratic scandals by the different newspapers, which we can compute from the newspaper-specific fixed effects. Let Once we obtain these newspaper-specific measures of slanted coverage, we check how they correlate with the explicit partisan position of each newspaper, as proxied by its endorsement pattern, and with the political leaning of consumers. The results are shown in Table 2 . We present results for three dependent variables: total hits, news hits and editorial hits. For each dependent variable we present the results of four regressions: in the first we simply regressŝ j against the endorsement partisanship N E j and a constant, in the second we do the same with reader partisanship N R j , in the third we control for both N E j and N R j , and in the fourth we add total average circulation as an additional control, expressed in thousands of yearly copies.
The main finding is that pro-Democratic coverage of scandals is significantly and positively correlated with a pro-Democratic endorsement pattern: newspapers with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic candidates give relatively more coverage to scandals involving Republican politicians than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republicanleaning newspapers do the opposite. This is robust across specifications, and is consistent with supply-driven models of media bias.
Regarding the partisanship of demand, there is no statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. However, when controlling for endorsement partisanship the point estimate suggests that the Democratic partisanship of readers is negatively correlated with pro-Democratic coverage of scandals.
As discussed above, competitive pressure in the media market should compress the bias in coverage if the latter originates from the ideological position on the supply side. The same is true if newspapers face Bayesian consumers who are uncertain about the quality of news reporting, as in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) . On the other hand, competition would exacerbate bias if newspapers cater to confirmation-seeking readers.
To shed some empirical light on these contrasting predictions, we checked whether the partial correlation ofŝ j with our measures of endorsement and reader partisanship is weaker or stronger in more competitive media environments. We consistently find a negative relationship -implying that more competition reduces supply-led bias -but the coefficients are rarely statistically significant at the .05 level.
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Partisan Bias: One-Stage Analysis
In this section we pool all of the data and perform a one-stage analysis with interaction terms. This is an alternative and more direct way to estimate whether the coverage of Democratic and Republican scandals of the various newspapers differs as a function of the endorsement score and the ideological leaning of readers. It also allows to delve further into the data, and investigate whether demand-driven or supply-led coverage bias is a function of specific features of the scandals themselves, such as their location.
Since we are exploiting the differential coverage of Republican and Democratic scandals by each newspaper, it is possible to include newspaper-specific fixed effects. More specifically, we run the following regression:
where RS i is a dummy which equals one when scandal i involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. We also run a regression in which we instead control for the interaction with the reader partisanship variable N R j , and a third one where both interactions are included. In a fourth specification we check whether the slant in the coverage of scandals depends on the localness of the scandal itself. We do so by adding two triple interactions between N E j (N R j ), RS i and a dummy which equals one if the politician involved in scandal i is from the state where newspaper j is located or from a congressional district that overlaps heavily with the market area of newspaper j.
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As in the previous section we separately consider total hits, news articles and editorials.
Also, to account for the possibility that the error terms across observations are correlated within newspapers, we compute standard errors that are clustered by newspaper.
The results are shown in Table 3 . The relative frequency of hits -for total hits, news hits, and editorial hits -is always positively and significantly correlated with the interaction between the endorsement score and the Republican scandal dummy. This corresponds to what we found in the two stage analysis. Moreover, the interaction between the partisanship of readers and the Republican dummy is negatively correlated with n ij , although this coefficient is statistically insignificant. However, when allowing for a differential partisan behavior for local and non local scandals, we find that newspapers mainly read in Democratic (Republican) areas devote significantly more coverage only to those Republican (Democratic) scandals which involve local politicians. Interestingly, this demand-driven coverage bias does not occur on the editorial page, but only in the news section (and with total hits, as the latter effect dominates the former). On the other hand, supply-led coverage bias is not confined to local scandals, as shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the simple interaction between N E j and RS i . The triple interaction of N E j with the "localness" dummy is positive, but not significant.
A plausible interpretation of these results is that newspapers would pander to the ideological tastes of readers only by slanting news material which is already known to them.
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On the other hand, editors and journalists pursuing a partisan bias in their coverage appear to be making use of any news material that is suitable to the purpose, whether local or not.
The coefficient on the interaction term N E j ×RS i provides an estimate of the differen- (N E j = 0.137), and the Denver Post from the New York Times (N E j = 0.491).
Robustness Checks
In this section we explore the robustness of our findings on coverage bias. As pointed out in the data section, we are particularly concerned with potential selection bias regarding the scandals under consideration. At the outset, one must however notice that selection bias would be a much more serious problem if we were trying to estimate the "absolute" level of newspaper bias, i.e. whether U.S. newspapers overall display a liberal or a conservative slant in the coverage of scandals. However, our research question is different, since it involves the relative amount of bias across newspapers and its correlates, and hence is much less prone to the distortions induced by selection bias.
In order to further deal with this issue, we run several robust checks conditional on our sample. This would also allow to check whether the average behavior of newspapers across scandals is in fact a combination of largely different "treatments" newspapers devote to heterogenous types of scandals.
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The time periods of the various scandals is a first source of heterogeneity. In our case, all scandals except those involving Democratic politicians James Traficant (Rep-OH) and Edwin Edwards (Gov-LA) began after George W. Bush became president in 2000. A potential concern is that newspapers might be differentially covering political scandals as a function of the match between their political affiliation (as proxied by the endorsement score) and the overall partisan climate at the federal level, which is of course heavily influenced by the political affiliation of the incumbent president. If, for example, newspapers are more aggressive in the bias of their coverage of scandals when the president belongs to the least favorite political party, then the average differential coverage of scandals might change when the president changes. This would not affect our estimates of the relative partisan bias, but one cannot exclude the further possibility that Democratic-endorsing and Republicanendorsing outlets react to a change in the political affiliation of the president with a different degree of aggressiveness, hence confounding our results.
Again separately displaying results for total hits, news articles and opinion pieces, Table   4 presents the outcome of this robustness check in the first column of each subgroup, whereas we exclude the Traficant and Edwards scandals from the analysis. Throughout, we adopt the more general specification where we jointly control for endorsement and reader partisanship, and their triple interactions with the localness dummy. The results are very similar -in terms of magnitude and statistical significance -to those reported in Table 3 .
As an additional check on the robustness of our results to sample selection -and to influential outliers -in an online appendix we drop scandals one at a time (Tables A2, A3 and A4). We do this separately for total hits, news and editorials, and focus on the fuller specification, whereas we include triple interactions of the endorsement partisanship variable (and readership partisanship) with the Republican scandal and the localness dummies (see columns 4, 8 and 12 in Table 3 ). The estimated coefficients are remarkably stable in their sign, magnitude and significance throughout the tables.
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Up to now, we have attached the same weight to all scandals within each party, irrespective of the ideology of the politicians involved. However, it might be more rewarding for a Democratic-leaning (Republican-leaning) newspaper to cover scandals involving staunchly conservative Republicans (liberal Democrats) rather than moderate ones. This logic would also apply to demand-side forces driving newspapers to cater to confirmation-seeking readers. Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) NOMINATE scores provide a widely used measure of the ideological locations of all of the politicians who served in the U.S. Congress. 31, 32 For the 27 politicians to whom we can attach a NOMINATE common space score, we check whether the amount of coverage devoted by a Democratic-endorsing newspaper to a given scandal is increasing in the ideological conservativeness of the involved politician (as proxied by the NOMINATE score), and vice versa for a Republican-endorsing newspaper. In order to implement this type of analysis, we simply run a specification similar to (??), with the RS i dummy replaced by the NOMINATE common space score.
The last column for each subgroup of news items in Table 4 reports the findings of this last robustness check. The interaction between the endorsement score and the NOMINATE common space score has a positive coefficient, which is significant for hits and news, but not for editorials. In the case of editorials, the triple interaction with the localness dummy is now significant at the 10 percent confidence level. On the other hand, the interaction of the NOMINATE score with the reader partisanship variable is negatively and insignificantly correlated with coverage, similar to what we found in the baseline specification.
Overall Scandal Coverage
As noted in the introduction, if the demand for information by consumers is what drives mass media behavior, then newspapers appealing to moderate voters should devote more total coverage to political scandals, irrespective of the political affiliation of the public officials involved. 33 Also, under reasonable conditions, newspapers that are read by larger and ideologically more heterogeneous audiences would find it profitable to cover all scandals, in order to satisfy (to some extent) all customers.
To assess these hypotheses, in this section we analyze the overall coverage of scandals.
The specifications are analogous to equations (2)-(4) above, but with a different dependent variable. 34 Since the results of the two-stage and one-stage analyses are qualitatively similar, we present only the one-stage analysis here. The results of the two-stage analysis can be found in the online appendix, in table A5.
Since our focus in this case is on newspaper-specific variables such as total circulation and reader moderateness, we cannot use fixed effects at the newspaper level. Instead, we run the following regression:
Again, we estimate the partisan coverage of scandals by interacting the Republican scandal dummy with N R j and N E j . Standard errors are again clustered at the newspaper level. correlated with overall coverage in the case of total hits and news hits, but it is not significant for editorials. On the other hand, the voter standard deviation variable is positively and significantly correlated with coverage, mildly so for total hits and news, strongly so for editorials. Finally, it is still the case that the interaction between endorsement partisanship and the Republican scandal dummy is positively and significantly correlated with coverage, while the interaction with reader partisanship is negatively and insignificantly correlated.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the coverage of political scandals by a large number of U.S. newspapers, focusing on supply and demand side determinants of any partisan bias in The main finding is that there is a strong correlation between the partisan leaning of newspapers as measured by their endorsement behavior, and the partisan bias in their coverage of political scandals. Specifically, Democratic-leaning newspapers -i.e., those with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic candidates in elections -give significantly more coverage to scandals involving Republican politicians than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-leaning newspapers behave in the opposite way. This bias in the coverage of scandals is not confined to the editorial page, but also affects the news section. While the fraction of stories devoted to political scandals is on average very small, the magnitude of the coverage bias effect is large in relative terms: a one-standard-deviation increase in a newspaper's propensity to endorse Democratic candidates is associated with an increase in differential coverage of Republican versus Democratic scandals of 26 percent.
We also find evidence that biased coverage of scandals "panders" to the partisan leaning We also find some evidence regarding factors that are correlated with the overall coverage of scandals. Newspapers with higher circulation systematically devote more coverage to political scandals, at least in the news section. Further work is needed to distinguish between demand-driven and supply-led accounts for this relationship.
Finally, regarding the issue of competition, we find no robust effects on bias or overall coverage. This may be in due in part to the fact that in the period we study most U.S.
newspaper markets are relatively uncompetitive. Thus, it will be interesting to study earlier time periods, when the number of newspapers was larger and there was probably more variation in the degree of competition across cities. 35 In addition, with historical data there are potential quasi-experiments we can exploit to better identify the effects of competition on media coverage. One is the demise of afternoon newspapers. Many scholars argue that this was caused by the spread of television and/or lifestyle changes, and therefore the decline can be treated as an exogenous shock to newspaper markets. If so, we can obtain a clean estimate of the effects of competition by comparing changes in newspaper coverage across cities with different initial numbers of afternoon newspapers.
One obvious weakness of our approach is that is purely cross-sectional. This is especially important since one of our goals is to begin disentangling the relative importance of demand and supply factors in affecting the bias in the coverage of scandals. As shown by Figure   1 , in the cross section of newspapers there is a positive and significant correlation between endorsement and reader partisanship, which is consistent with many of the theoretical models discussed in the introduction. However, this correlation is rather low, i.e. there is a sizeable "slack" between the partisan position on the demand and the supply side. We exploit this slack in order to try and distinguish the correlation of slanted coverage with the ideological stance on the demand and on the supply side. From this point of view, it is especially interesting to notice that endorsement and reader partisanship are correlated with scandal coverage in distinct ways: unconditionally so for endorsement partisanship, only for local scandals in the case of reader partisanship. Given that we do not have a proper experiment or natural experiment, however, we cannot conclude that ideology on either the supply or demand side of the newspaper market has a causal effect on scandal coverage.
We are more confident asserting that the correlations we find cast doubt on one of the basic tenets of a free press -the duty of the press to behave as watchdogs vis a vis incumbent politicians. Newspapers cover political scandals, but they do so in systematically biased ways, which appear to depend on the partisan positions of their publishers, editors, and readers.
One issue we do not address, but which would be interesting for future work, is whether the amount and bias of coverage varies across different types of scandals. In particular, sex scandals might be different than financial scandals, since "sex sells." In addition, the power of the office held by the person involved in the scandal may have a significant influence not only on the amount of coverage but also on bias. It may be much easier for publishers, editors, and journalists to "pick and choose" which scandals to cover when the scandals involve low-level officials in other states or areas. Thus, there might be even more bias in the coverage of low-level scandals than in the relatively high-level scandals studied here.
Notes
1 Although the relationship between endorsement behavior and readers' partisanship is positive and statistically significant, the correlation is only about 0.3. This suggests that the endorsement behavior of a given newspaper is a reasonable indicator of "supply side" forces pinning down its editorial position. We discuss this in more detail in the next section. Giornale and Libero. 16 A few newspapers have an explicit policy not to endorse candidates for political offices -e.g., the Deseret News in Salt Lake City, the Orange County Register, and the Colorado Springs Gazette. Also, many smaller dailies do not bother to make political endorsements.
17 Our sample contains a few cases where a newspaper endorsed both candidates in a race.
We drop these from our analysis.
18 After redistricting there are some U.S. House races with two incumbents running. In these cases we set I ijt = 0. There are a few such cases in our sample, and if we drop them the results are unchanged. 19 The panel is unbalanced, since in the earlier years some newspapers lack endorsement data. The model also includes year fixed-effects, θ t , to capture partisan tides. 20 When matching coverage and endorsement data, newspapers under a joint operating agreement are tricky cases. These agreements typically imply that the news section is common among participants, while the editorial sections are separate. However, in four such instances the NewsLibrary archive reports data for only one outlet. We dropped those cases (i.e. eight outlets). 21 We also considered a simpler measure of reader partisanship, with weights of 1 for a newspaper's home county and 0 for all other counties. The results using this measure are quite similar to those using the circulation-weighted measure. are influenced by the ideological position of media outlets to which they are exposed. In both cases we would tend to expect a positive equilibrium correlation along the lines of that displayed in Figure 1 . 23 The standard deviation is widely used as a proxy for the relative share of independents or moderates in states, districts, and counties. This measure was introduced by Wright (1974) .
See also Wallis (1984) . An area where the vote exhibits large fluctuations between the two parties presumably has a large share of independents or moderates, since loyal partisans and ideological extremists will rarely change their vote between elections.
24 Note that this is only a relative measure -we do not make any claims about the absolute ideological position of media outlets. 25 As often occurs with interacted variables, our data exhibit a substantial amount of multicollinearity, making it difficult to disentangle the role played by competitive forces in determining slanted coverage. 26 In other terms, this dummy equals one when the Instate or the Local dummies are equal to one, and zero otherwise. ≈ 0.260. 29 Note, for example, that we have already found evidence that newspapers cater to partisan tastes of readers only when scandals involve local politicians. 30 One might be also concerned that the endorsement partisanship scores are generated regressors, hence it can be more efficient to take into account the variance-covariance matrix associated with them (Pagan 1984) . On the other hand, the choice of clustering the standard errors at the newspaper level allows to be prudential regarding the overall precision of our estimates. One reasonable way to accomodate these concerns is to run Weighted Least In the first stage (not reported) the relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed effects, scandal-specific fixed effects and dummies for the localness of the scandal. This is separately done for the coverage of Republican and Democratic scandals. In the regressions reported here, the dependent variable is the difference between the newspaper-specific fixed effect in the coverage of Republican scandals minus the corresponding fixed effect in the coverage of Democratic ones. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and are reported in brackets below each coefficient. The relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed effects, scandal-specific fixed effects, dummies for the localness of the scandal and an interaction between the endorsement score and a "Republican scandal" dummy. This dummy equals one when the scandal involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. The same interaction is computed for the reader partisanship variable. These interaction terms are further interacted with a dummy which equals one when the scandal is a local one. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level, and are reported in brackets below each coefficient. The relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed effects, scandal-specific fixed effects, dummies for the localness of the scandal and an interaction between the endorsement score and a "Republican scandal" dummy. This dummy equals one when the scandal involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. The same interaction is computed for the reader partisanship variable. In the first column within each subgroup we restrict attention to recent scandals; in the second one we interact the endorsement score (and the reader partisanship variable) with the NOMINATE common space score of the person involved, if available. The relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against scandal-specific fixed effects, dummies for the localness of the scandal and an interaction between the endorsement score and a "Republican scandal" dummy. This dummy equals one when the scandal involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. The same interaction is computed for the reader partisanship variable. The focus is on total circulation of each newspaper and the standard deviation of the Democratic vote in the area where the newspaper is sold. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level, and are reported in brackets below each coefficient.
